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Quantum private states are the states that represent some amount of perfect secure key. A simple
symmetry of any generalised private quantum state (ie. the states that represent perfect key but
not fully random) is provided and extended on Devetak-Winter so called ccq (classical-classical-
quantum) and cqq (classical-quantum-quantum) lower bound on secure key. This symmetry is
used to develop a practical method of estimating the Alice measurement that is optimal form the
perspective of single shot Devetak-Witner lower bound on secure key. The method is particularly
good when the noise does not break the symmetry of the state with respect to the lower bound
formula. It suggest a general paradigm for quick estimation of quantum communication rates under
the symmetry of a given resource like state and/or channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Entanglement is considered as a resource in quantum communication and computing. It has many intriguing
properties that make in some cases quantum physics predictions drastically different from classical ones (see [1]).
Any BB84 type protocol [2] is formally equivalent to some version of entangled based protocol of the type E91 [3].
On the level of uncorrelated sources Bennett et al. pointed out this fact on specific scheme [4] which was later
naturally extended to a quantum privacy amplification QPA [5] based entanglement distillation protocol [6]. The
general intrinsic connection between BB84 secret key generation and possibility of maximal entanglement distillation
from correlated sources of noisy entanglement was provided explicitly by elegant error correction type analysis [7]
which in particular illuminated this aspect hidden in previous proofs. However the fundamental intuition behind
the BB84 secret key generation - entanglement distillation equivalence is already present in the case of uncorrelated
source for which QPA protocol works. The latter is a protocol that distills maximally entangled states out of a mixed
states in a well defined way. In QPA it is eavesdropper that is representing the noise and the distillation procedure
is aimed at remove the correlations with eavesdropper in the process that produces a pure output state - maximally
entangled state that is a source of perfect key. It seemed that this QPA is necessary to get privacy. However there
exists nondistillable entanglement called bound entanglement [8] for which by the very definition QPA in its original
form can not work. It turns out that there is another possibility of distilling secret key by distilling private states [9]
that are generalisations of maximally entangled states - they provide secret key under the measurement in a fixed basis
on some part of the system. The measurement basis may be unique and that is what makes the private states more
general form maximally entangled ones for which there are infinite many pairs of local bases that provide secure key.
The distillation of private states allow to provide secret key form bound entanglement (see [9]) showing in particular
a possibility of drastic separation between amount of pure entanglement that can be distilled from a quantum state
(called distillable entanglement and denoted by D) and amount of secret key that can be distilled from the same state
(called disiilalble secret key and denoted by K). Recently the separation D < K was experimentally demonstrated
together with the illustration how inefficient may be the original entanglement distillation based scheme, if compared
with p-bit based protocols [10].
In this article we present the new symmetry of the states with perfect secure key called generalized private states,
which states that in the most popular Devetak-Winter protocol secret key rate is invariant in both scenarios of CCQ
and CQQ type if the measurement bases, chosen in a wrong way, are rotated around the axis corresponding to the
secure basis by any angle. Then we use this symmetry to propose a new method of searching the optimal basis, which
allows to obtain optimal amount of distillable key with respect to the Devetak-Winter secret key rate, in the case
when a state possessing this symmetry was rotated by an unknown angle. We investigate the influence of various qubit
channels on the result of the method and show that the proposed method is an optimal one as long as a channel is
bistochastic. Finally we derive the error estimation of numerical implementation of the procedure and show examples
of the results.
II. A USEFUL SYMMETRY OF THE GENERALISED PRIVATE STATES
According to [11] any state containing perfectly secure key corresponds to a pure state shared by three parties
Alice, Bob and Eve. Unlike the eavesdropper subsystem E with a Hilbert space HE the subsystems of Alice and Bob
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2are composite and correspond to the tensor products of Hilbert spaces HA ⊗ HA′ and HB ⊗ HB′ respectively. We
call the subsystem corresponding to the pair A,B the key part since this is the part that is used for key generation
by local von Neumann measurements while the pair A’B’ is called the shield part since it is in a sense responsible for
protecting the key. The above structure allows to write explicitly the pure state of the three parties which represents
a perfectly secure random a perfectly secure random statistics ~p = [p0, ..., pd−1]. It is a pure state |ΨAA′BB′〉 of the
following form which we shall call generalised private states:
|ΨAA′BB′E〉 =
∑
ij
cicj |ii〉AB ⊗ [U (i)A′B′ ⊗ IE ]|ΨA′B′E〉 (1)
for some fixed |ΨA′B′E〉, some unitaries U (i)A′B′ and probabilities {pi = |ci|2}. The basis |ii〉AB is called the secure
basis since after performing the local von Neumann measurements in that basis Alice and Bob share the correlated
probability distribution {pijAB = δijpi}d−1i=0 which is completely uncorrelated form the system E. Here we do not assume
them to be necessarily pi =
1
d as it is in the case of the private states. In fact the density matrix corresponding to the
state vector (1) is of the form:
ρpriv =
∑
ij
cicj [|ii〉 〈jj|]AB ⊗ [|Ψi〉 〈Ψj |]A′B′E , (2)
where we put |Ψi〉 = [UA′B′⊗IE ]|Ψ〉A′B′E dropping the superscripts A′B′E. If Alice and Bob measure the subsystems
AB in some basis {|ei〉A}, {|fi〉B} and trace the shield subsystems A′B′ they get the so called the form of the CCQ
state with respect to the (product) basis BAB = {|eifi〉AB ≡ |ei〉A ⊗ |fi〉B}:
ρCCQ,BABABE ({|ei, fj〉}) =
d−1∑
i=0
qi |ei〉 〈ei|A ⊗ |fi〉 〈fi|B ⊗ ρiE
with some probability distribution qi. It happens that if they choose the basis {|eifj〉AB} to be just equal to the
secure one B0AB = {|ij〉AB} then the above state reduces to the product form
ρ
CCQ,B0AB
ABE = (
d−1∑
i=0
pi[|ii〉 〈ii|]AB)⊗ ρE
with qi = pi. Because of the explicitly product form - no correlations of the E system with the key part AB are
present here. Before proving some new property let us remind that the so called CQQ state with respect to the basis
BA = {|ei〉A which results form Alice local von Neumann measurement and tracing out both A’B’:
ρCQQ,BAABE =
d−1∑
i=0
qi |ei〉 〈ei|A ⊗ ρiBE (3)
Note that measuring the private state in the local basis B0A being just the reduction of the product secure basis
B0AB we get still the CCQ state in the form (3) rather than the general CQQ state (note that any CCQ state is a
CQQ one but not vice versa) which is a consequence of the private character of the state.
A. The Devetak-Winter protocol rates
We have a natural definition of the key rates in one-way protocols obtained by measuring the state first in some
local basis BA or a product one BAB which will produce the CQQ or CCQ state respectively and then calculating the
difference of the Holevo functions of the states:
KBADW (ρABE) = IA:B(ρ
CQ
AB)− IA:E(ρCQAE) (4)
with ρCQAB , ρ
CQ
AE being a suitable reductions of the state ρ
CQQ,BA
ABE resulting form the original state ρABE after the local
Alice measurement associated with the basis BA. In full analogy we have
KBABDW (ρABE) = IA:B(ρ
CC
AB)− IA:E(ρCQAE) (5)
with the suitable reductions of the state ρCCQ,BABABE resulting form the original state ρABE after the product of the
two local Alice and Bob measurements corresponding to the bases BAB . The role of the function f is played just by
the mutual information function I.
3B. General symmetry rule and its simple application
In what follows we shall use the notation Uˆ(X) = UXU† and Mˆ({Pk})(X) =
∑
k PkXPk with a projectors
Pk = P (ek) = |ek〉〈ek| for any orthonormal basis {ek}. We have a simple
Observation .- Consider a function f defined on any CQ state on the composite system XY
σCQXY =
∑
k
Pk ⊗ σk (6)
Assume that the function f is invariant under some subgroup RX of unitary operations RX ∈ RX on the system X
ie.
∀RX∈RXf(RˆX ⊗ IˆY (σCQXY ) = f(σCQXY ) (7)
Given any state ρXY which is invariant in an analogous way
∀RX∈RX RˆX ⊗ IˆY (ρXY ) = ρXY (8)
we have the following identity
f([MˆX({RˆX(Pk)})⊗ IˆY ](ρXY )) = f([MˆX({Pk})⊗ IˆY ](ρXY )) (9)
for all RX ∈ RX and all {Pk} constructed from any orthonormal bases {ek}.
Proof. - It is obvious to see that ,,internal” Rˆ†X is absorbed by the QQ state ρXY while the external conjugated
one RˆX is absorbed by the invariance of the function f .
We have immediate conclusion:
Conclusion.- The functions (4) and (5), if calculated on a given generalised private state (2), are invariant under
the rotations RˆA⊗ IˆBE and RˆA⊗ RˆB ⊗ IˆE respectively where RA, RB are any unitary operations which are diagonal
in the local bases |i〉A, |j〉B forming a secure basis of the states (2).
Proof .- The role of the pair of the subsystems {X,Y } is played by {A,BE} or {AB,E} respectively and the role
of the subgroup are all the unitary operations diagonal in the bases described in the conclusion.
C. Consequences
In the case, when the key part dimension d = 2, this feature can be interpreted graphically. Let us consider CQQ
case. Then Alice can choose two angels (θ, ϕ) to determine her measurement basis using the eigenvectors of the σnˆ
operator
|e0 (θ, ϕ)〉 =
[
cos θ2
eiϕ sin θ2
]
, |e1 (θ, ϕ)〉 =
[
sin θ2
−eiϕ cos θ2
]
. (10)
We define the function KD(θ,ϕ) = K
DW
D
(
ρ
C(θ,ϕ)QQ
priv
)
. Here superscript C(θ, ϕ) denotes that to calculate CQQ state
base vectors determined by angels (θ, ϕ) were used. In spherical coordinate system, in which |e0 (0, 0)〉 , |e1 (0, 0)〉
coincide with the base vectors used in (2) the function KD(θ,ϕ) is ϕ independent, i.e. becomes function only of θ
angle.
III. PROCEDURE
As follows from the previous section, points on the sphere[16] possessing the same vale of KD establish a circle,
whose center is located at intersection of Z axis and the sphere. Moreover, each circle has a center in the same point
(all circles are concentric). At this point vale of KD is maximal. Using facts presented in Subsection II C one is able
to find such angles θMax, ϕMax, for which the measurement in basis given by (10) will lead to the maximal value of
KD, without a priori knowledge of this basis or rotations by which the state was changed. Suppose that the original
ideal state was rotated by unknown transformation UA ⊗ IBA′B′ which eventually changed its optimal measurement
basis on Alice side from {|0zˆ〉 , |1zˆ〉} to {|0nˆ〉 , |1nˆ〉} where we define nˆ = Ozˆ as:
|0nˆ〉 〈0nˆ| = U |0zˆ〉 〈0zˆ|U† = 1
2
(I + (Ozˆ)~σ)
|1nˆ〉 〈1nˆ| = U |1zˆ〉 〈1zˆ|U† = 1
2
(I − (Ozˆ)~σ).
(11)
4The procedure is as follows.
1. First one chooses arbitrary values of angles θ0, ϕ0 and establishes two base vectors |e0 (θ0, ϕ0)〉 and |e1 (θ0, ϕ0)〉.
This basis is used to perform measurement and to obtain value of KD(θ0,ϕ0) equal KD0.
2. Then one changes the value of θ0 to θ1 and creates a set of base vectors {|e0 (θ1, ϕi)〉 , |e1 (θ1, ϕi)〉}Ni=1. Vectors
from this set differ in the value of ϕi angle by arbitrary constant factor
2pi
N so that 0 ≤ ϕi < 2pi. One can ascribe
each vector from the set to a corresponding point on the sphere. These points lay on a circle, whose centre is
located at the point ascribed to vector |e0 (θ0, ϕ0)〉.
3. Subsequently, using the vectors from the set, the measurements are performed and for each pair of vectors
|e0 (θ1, ϕi)〉 , |e1 (θ1, ϕi)〉 the value of KDi is calculated. A set of values KD,N ={KD1, . . . , KDN} is created.
The aim of these measurements is to find two points laying on a chosen circle, characterized by values of ϕi
angle, for which value of KDi is equal to earlier calculated value KD0. It is not difficult to see that it is always
possible to achieve this purpose when we assume continuity of ϕ (or arbitrary small resolution in ϕi). According
Subsection II C, because the sphere is covered with circles with the same value of KD, any other circle laying on
the sphere can have 0, 1, 2 or infinity intersection points. Thus it is always possible to find such values of θ0, θ1,
which ensure that points with the same value of KD are found. Just as for a plane, three points on the sphere
are enough to unambiguously determine the circle. The radius and the centre of the circle are found solving the
system of equations:
d(θMax, ϕMax, θ0, ϕ0) = R (12)
d(θMax, ϕMax, θ1, ϕ1) = R (13)
d(θMax, ϕMax, θ1, ϕ2) = R, (14)
where d is spherical distance defined as [13]:
d = arccos(P ·Q), (15)
here P, Q are two points on the sphere characterized by angles θi, ϕi and θj , ϕj , respectively. In therms of
Cartesian coordinates (x = sin θ cosϕ, y = sin θ sinϕ and z = cos θ) expression (15) is of a form:
d(θi, ϕi, θj , ϕj) =
= arccos(sin θi sin θj cos(ϕi − ϕj) + cos θi cos θj). (16)
According to Subsection II C centre of the circle determined in this way is associated with the basis (characterized by
angles θMax, ϕMax), in which KD (θ, ϕ) has maximal value. Fig. 1 presents main ideas of the proposed procedure.
The proposed procedure can be slightly modified. Finding two points with value of KDi exactly equal KD0
can cause a problem and such solution is not a practical one. To overcome this difficulty, instead of finding two points
with the same value of KD, one finds points KD1, KD2 from the set KD,N , for which the values of KD1,KD2 are the
closest to the KD0 i.e. for which ∆KD1 = KD0 − KD1 and ∆KD2 = KD0 − KD2 are minimal. Subsequently the
interpolating function I{KD,N} (θ1, ϕ) from the set KD,N is created. To construct the interpolation function Hermite
polynomials of a required order are used. Thus one can write for i = {1, 2}:
KD0 =
= KDi + ∆KDi =
= KD (θ1, ϕi) +
∂I{KD,N} (θ1, ϕ)
∂ϕ
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=ϕi
∆ϕi
+
∂2I{KD,N} (θ1, ϕ)
∂ϕ2
∣∣∣∣∣
ϕ=ϕi
∆ϕ2i =
= I{KD,N} (θ1, ϕi) +
∂I{KD,N} (θ1, ϕ)
∂ϕ
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=ϕi
∆ϕi
+
∂2I{KD,N} (θ1, ϕ)
∂ϕ2
∣∣∣∣∣
ϕ=ϕi
∆ϕ2i ,
(17)
5where we use the fact that I{KD,N} (θ1, ϕi) = KDi (i.e. the interpolation function reproduces the values of KDi from
the set KD,N in the probe points). One solves equation (17) for ∆ϕi, i = {1, 2}. In general, equation (17) can have
two different solutions. However, in such a case one chooses smaller ∆ϕ1 and ∆ϕ2 (because equation (17) is Taylor
expansion of function I{KD,N} (θ1, ϕ) near ϕ = ϕi). By solving modified systems of equations:
d(θMax, ϕMax, θ0, ϕ0) = R (18)
d(θMax, ϕMax, θ1, ϕ1 + ∆ϕ1) = R (19)
d(θMax, ϕMax, θ1, ϕ2 + ∆ϕ2) = R, (20)
one obtains values of θMax, ϕMax.
The proposed approach enables to find the basis optimizing the value of KD by performing only local measurements.
IV. ERROR ESTIMATION
Due to approximation (finite sum) and possible numerical errors, it is never possible to solve (17) exactly. As a
result angles θ′M , ϕ
′
M will not lead to the maximal value of distillable key. In this section the estimation of this error
is provided. Let us denote (see Fig. 2):
ϕ˜1 = ϕ1 + ∆ϕ1 = ϕ
′
1 + ∆ϕ
′
1
ϕ˜2 = ϕ2 + ∆ϕ2 = ϕ
′
2 + ∆ϕ
′
2
θM + ∆θM = θ
′
M
ϕM + ∆ϕM = ϕ
′
M . (21)
Without loss of generality, we can arrange ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2 so that ϕ˜1 > ϕ˜2. Spherical distance between points characterized
by angles (θi, ϕi), (θj , ϕj) is given by (15). We assume that (θi, ϕi) = (0, 0), so
arccos [cos θ′M ] = R (22)
arccos [sin θ1 sin θ
′
M cos (ϕ˜1 − ϕ′M ) + cos θ1 cos θ′M ] = R (23)
arccos [sin θ1 sin θ
′
M cos (ϕ˜2 − ϕ′M ) + cos θ1 cos θ′M ] = R. (24)
Combining 23 and 24 we get:
cos (ϕ˜1 − ϕ′M ) = cos (ϕ˜2 − ϕ′M ) . (25)
Because ϕ˜1 6= ϕ˜2 and ϕ′M ∈ (0, 2pi] there are two possibilities: ϕ˜1 − ϕ′M = − (ϕ˜2 − ϕ′M ) or ϕ˜1 − ϕ′M =
− (ϕ˜2 − ϕ′M − 2pi) . We set ϕ′M := ϕ′M mod 2pi
ϕ′M =
ϕ˜1 + ϕ˜2
2
ϕM + ∆ϕM =
ϕ1 + ϕ2
2
+
∆ϕ1 + ∆ϕ2
2
,
(26)
so ∆ϕM =
∆ϕ1+∆ϕ2
2 . However, we know only ϕ
′
i, ∆ϕ
′
i but we can estimate (see Fig. 2) as |∆ϕi| < ∆ϕ− |∆ϕ′i| . As a
result
∆ϕM <
2∆ϕ− |∆ϕ′1| − |∆ϕ′2|
2
. (27)
Combining equations (22) and (23)
cot θ′M = cot
θ1
2
cos (ϕ˜1 − ϕ′M ) . (28)
As a consequence of the equality
cos (ϕ˜1 − ϕ′M ) = cos
(
ϕ1 + ∆ϕ1 − ϕ1 + ∆ϕ1 + ϕ2 + ∆ϕ2
2
)
=
cos
(
ϕ1 + ∆ϕ1 − ϕ2 −∆ϕ2
2
)
, (29)
6we obtain the following relation
θM = arccot
[
cot
θ1
2
cos
(
ϕ1 − ϕ2
2
)]
(30)
and
θM + ∆θ
′
M = arccot
[
cot
θ1
2
cos (ϕ˜1 − ϕ′M )
]
. (31)
In order to obtain the upper bound on ∆θ′M we have to find θ¯M - an lower bound on θM . Then the following relation
holds:
θ¯M + ∆θ
′
M < θM + ∆θ
′
M = arccot
[
cot
θ1
2
cos (ϕ˜1 − ϕ′M )
]
, (32)
so ∆θ′M < arccot
[
cot θ12 cos (ϕ˜1 − ϕ′M )
] − θ¯M . We have to estimate the difference ϕ1 − ϕ2 using known quantities
ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2. There are two different possibilities: in the first one ϕ˜1 − ϕ˜2 < pi whereas in the second ϕ˜1 − ϕ˜2 > pi. Let us
consider the first one. Because arccotx ∈ (−pi2 , pi2 ] is a decreasing function for x ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0,∞), in order to find
θ¯M we have to increase cos
(
ϕ1−ϕ2
2
)
. For our purposes we shall assume the worst case, namely ϕ˜1 < ϕ1 and ϕ˜2 > ϕ2.
Then ϕ1 −ϕ2 > ϕ˜1 − ϕ˜2. From previous considerations the following relation holds: ϕ˜i + ∆ϕ > ϕi > ϕ˜i −∆ϕi. As a
result ϕ˜1 − ϕ˜2 + 2∆ϕ > ϕ1 − ϕ2 > ϕ˜1 − ϕ˜2. Using this inequality we get
θM > θ¯M1 = arccot
[
cot
θ1
2
cos
(
ϕ˜1 − ϕ˜2 + 2∆ϕ
2
)]
. (33)
If ϕ˜1 − ϕ˜2 > pi the similar line of reasoning leads to
θM > θ¯M2 = arccot
[
cot
θ1
2
cos
(
ϕ˜1 − ϕ˜2 − 2∆ϕ
2
)]
. (34)
Finally one gets
∆θ′M < arccot
[
cot
θ1
2
cos (ϕ˜1 − ϕ′M )
]
− θ¯Mi, (35)
where θ¯Mi, i = {1, 2} is given by (33) or (34). Using perturbed points (θi, ϕ˜i) one obtains the point (θM +∆θM , ϕM +
∆ϕM )which differs from the real point (θM , ϕM ) by (∆θM ,∆ϕM ), where ∆θM ,∆ϕM are given by (31) and (27). In
the new coordinate system associated with the point (θM + ∆θM , ϕM + ∆ϕM ) the error is given by:
∆θ = arccos [ sin θ′M sin (θ
′
M −∆θM ) cos ∆φM +
+ cos θ′M cos (θ
′
M −∆θM )] . (36)
V. CONDITIONS FOR INVARAINCE OF KEY RATE IN CASE OF LOCAL ACTION OF PAULI
CHANNELS
According to [11], using appropriate unitary operation U = 1A⊗
∑
i |i〉 〈i| ⊗U (i)A′B′ (called twisting) it is possible to
write a particular private state as:
ρpriv = |Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+|AB ⊗ σA′B′ , (37)
where |Ψ+〉 is one of the four Bell states |Ψ±〉 , |φ±〉
|Ψ±〉 = |00〉 ± |11〉√
2
, |φ±〉 = |01〉 ± |10〉√
2
. (38)
After sending (37) down the channel ΛA⊗I where ΛA(·) =
∑
i piKi(·)K†i with Ki = {I, σx, σy, σz} (note that twisting
commutes with the action of the channel) one obtains a state
ρ˜priv = (p1 |Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+|AB + p4 |Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−|AB
p2 |φ+〉 〈φ+|AB + p3 |φ−〉 〈φ−|AB)⊗ σA′B′ .
(39)
7The purification of this state is given by∣∣∣Ψ˜〉
priv
=
[
p1√
2
(|00〉AB + |11〉AB) |0〉E¯
p4√
2
(|00〉AB − |11〉AB) |1〉E¯
p2√
2
(|01〉AB + |10〉AB) |2〉E¯
p3√
2
(|01〉AB − |10〉AB) |3〉E¯
]
⊗ |ψσ〉A′B′E ,
(40)
where E¯, E denote Eves’ subsystem. It follows from (4) that we can trace over subsystems A’B’E (due to additivity
of Von Neumann entropy for tensor product states KBADW is independent of subsystems A’B’E). In order to find the
value of the key rate due to Devetak - Winter protocol (4) we calculate the cqq state using base vectors defined by
(10). The nonzero elements of the reduced AB matrix are given by
1
2
a0000 = cos
2 θ
2
(p1 + p4) + sin
2 θ
2
(p2 + p3)
1
2
a0101 = sin
2 θ
2
(p1 + p4) + cos
2 θ
2
(p2 + p3)
1
2
a1010 = sin
2 θ
2
(p1 + p4) + cos
2 θ
2
(p2 + p3)
1
2
a1111 = cos
2 θ
2
(p1 + p4) + sin
2 θ
2
(p2 + p3)
1
2
a0001 = a
∗
0100 = e
iϕ sin
θ
2
cos
θ
2
(p1 − p4) + e−iϕ sin θ
2
cos
θ
2
(p2 − p3)
1
2
a1011 = a
∗
1110 = e
iϕ sin
θ
2
cos
θ
2
(p4 − p1) + e−iϕ sin θ
2
cos
θ
2
(p3 − p2) .
(41)
As a result entropies of Alice and Bob are equal SA = SB = 1. The reduced AB matrix is block diagonal so its
eigenvalues are
λ1,2 =
1
4
(
1 +
√
cos2 θ (p1 + p4 − p2 − p3)2 + sin2 θ |eiϕ (p1 − p4) + e−iϕ (p2 − p3)|2
)
λ3,4 =
1
4
(
1−
√
cos2 θ (p1 + p4 − p2 − p3)2 + sin2 θ |eiϕ (p1 − p4) + e−iϕ (p2 − p3)|2
)
.
(42)
As a consequence, IA:B will be independent of ϕ angle if and only if p1 − p4 or p2 = p3. In order to minimize joint
entropy SA:B one has to set θ = 0 or θ =
pi
2 depending on {p1, p2, p4} or {p1, p2, p3}. Setting θ = 0 will be optimal
if (p1 + p4 − 2p2) > 0 for p2 = p3 or (p2 + p3 − 2p1) > 0 for p1 = p4 , otherwise θ = pi2 . In order to show that IA:E¯
is independent of ϕ and let us consider a state resulting from the measurement performed on E¯ subsystem. This
operation does not increase the value of IA:E¯ (which we denote as I
M
A:E¯
) so we have IA:E¯ ≥ IMA:E¯ and due to (4)
KBADW (ρ˜priv) = IA:B − IA:E¯ ≥ IA:B − IMA:E¯ . (43)
After measurement the reduced AE¯ matrix has following eigenvalues λ1,2 =
p1
2 , λ3,4 =
p2
2 , λ5,6 =
p3
2 , λ7,8 =
p4
2 whereas
the eigenvalues of E¯ matrix are given by λ1 = p1, λ2 = p2, λ3 = p3, λ4 = p4 so we obtain that IA:E¯ is independent of
θ. As a result if p1 = p4 or p2 = p3 the distillable key will preserve its invariance and the proposed procedure will be
valid.
8VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we provide some examples of the results obtained by implementing the above procedure numerically.
Rotated ρSWAP state. - Consider a private state introduced in [9] and realized experimentally [12]
ρSWAP =
1
4
|Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−|AB ⊗ |Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−|A′B′ +
1
4
|Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+|AB ⊗ IA′B′
−1
4
|Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+|AB ⊗ |φ−〉 〈φ−|A′B′ . (44)
This state was rotated and then the optimizing procedure was applied. The example of the results is shown in Fig. 3.
Depolaraizig channel. - The procedure was checked using the rotated state ρ˜SWAP = ΛA ⊗ IBA′B′ , where Λ(ρ) =
p I2 + (1− p)ρ. The example of the results is shown in Fig. 4.
Phase flip channel. - Another test was performed using the rotated ρ˜SWAP = ΛA ⊗ IBA′B′ , where Λ(ρ) =
pρ+ (1− p)σzρσz. The example of the results is shown in Fig. 5.
Rotated mixture of ρSWAP and ρMSWAP states. - Another example of the private states is a state
ρMSWAP =
1
2
|φ−〉 〈φ−| ⊗
(
1
2
|00〉 〈00|+ |Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+|
)
+
+
1
2
|φ+〉 〈φ+| ⊗
(
1
2
|11〉 〈11| |Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−|
)
. (45)
This state plays a role in bound entangled secure key [14]. We checked the procedure using rotated mixture of two
private states ρpriv = pρSWAP+(1−p)ρMSWAP and the rotated ρ˜SWAP = ΛA⊗IBA′B′ , where Λ(ρ) = pρ+(1−p)σzρσz.
The example of the results is shown in Fig. 6.
Qubit channel with trigonometrical parametrization. - Consider a channel given by the Kraus operators [15]
K1 =
[
cos
u
2
cos
v
2
]
I +
[
sin
u
2
sin
v
2
]
σz
K2 =
[
cos
u
2
sin
v
2
]
σx − i
[
sin
u
2
cos
v
2
]
σy (46)
which transforms the Bloch vector ~r = [rx, ry, rz]
T
of the state into ~r′ = [cosurx, cos vry, cosu cos vrz + sinu sin v]
T
.
It follows from Section V that in general this channel does not preserve the invariance of distillable key. In this case
the procedure fails. The example of the results is shown in Fig. 7.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In the present paper the new symmetry of the states with perfect secure key called generalized private states
have been provided which says that the most popular Devetak-Winter protocol secret key rate is invariant in both
scenarios of CCQ and CQQ type if the measurement bases, chosen in a wrong way, are rotated (in a sense of angular
momentum) around the axis corresponding to the secure basis by any angle. The symmetry has a particularly good
interpretation when seen on a sphere since then the wrong is any basis corresponding to nˆ with an angle θ to the zˆ
axis (corresponding to the secure basis) while the symmetry rotation is just the rotation by the φ angle around the
zˆ axis. We have also proven that for the qubit key part the optimality of the zˆ axis as the secure basis is preserved
after the action of any bistochastic channel (i.e. the one represented by random Pauli rotations).
The symmetry of the ideal p-bit lead us to the heuristic scheme of estimation of the optimal axis (with respect to
the Devetak-Winter secret key rate KDW ) which is valid for any state that has this type of symmetry of the key rate
under the rotation around the optimal basis. Namely given the density matrix, may be even in a numerical form,
instead of searching over all sphere Alice may perform the analysis of the key over a ring around some chosen axis zˆ′
on the sphere and guess the optimal measurement axis only on the data based on this ring.
The method generally has a ,,dualistic” character with respect to the channel action. If the Alice subsystem as the
direction of the optimal axis unperturbed, than the results are good if the zˆ′ is chosen to be far form the (unknown)
optimal one zˆ while if there is a perturbation of the optimal direction zˆ (in a sense of the shrinking of that direction
on a Bloch sphere) then the closer is the chosen axis to the original one the result is better. Basing on the polynomial
approximation of the key function on the chosen ring there is also the possibility of the derivation of the error bar
9FIG. 1: Local Alice’s sphere with two different coordinate systems. Z axis corresponds to θMax, ϕMax angles whereas Z’ to
θ0, ϕ0 angles. Black circle shows the path along which angle ϕ changes. At the intersection point between Z axis and the
sphere KD(θMax, ϕMax) = KDMax. The intersection point between Z’ axis and the sphere is denoted by (θ0, ϕ0). At this point
KD(θ0, ϕ0) = KD0. Points with the same value of KD (laying on a circle, whose center is located at the point KD0) are denoted
by (θ1, ϕ1) and (θ1, ϕ2). At the first point KD(θ1, ϕ1) = KD1, whereas at the second point KD(θ1, ϕ2) = KD2.
FIG. 2: Starting point for the procedure (θ0, ϕ0), in which K (θ0, ϕ0) = KD0. Point (θ1, ϕ
′
1), KD0 = K (θ1, ϕ
′
1) is closest to
the point (θ0, ϕ0) in the given set because∆KD1 = |KD0 −KD1| is minimal (see text for details). Using the interpolation
function one obtains that K (θ1, ϕ
′
1 + ∆ϕ
′
1) = KD0, however, due to numerical error, in fact ϕ
′
1 + ∆ϕ
′
1 6= ϕ1, where the equality
KD (θ1, ϕ
′
1 + ∆ϕ
′
1) = K (θ0, ϕ0) really holds. The case of the second point (θ1, ϕ
′
2 + ∆ϕ
′
2) is similar. The error of the procedure
is given by (36).
of the procedure. The analysis of examples shows that the error bar in general bounds the actual value of the error
made in the procedure.
We believe that the present method may be especially useful when the large sample of data are provided and quick
estimation of optimal Alice measurement is needed.
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FIG. 3: The estimated error of the procedure (using formula (36)) - left plot, and the error of the procedure (absolute value of
the difference between rotation angle and the angle calculated by the procedure ∆θ = |θ − θM′ | ) -right plot vs. the number
of points r=10n (n=1 denotes that 10 points were used) for the rotated ρSWAP state. Rotation angle θ =
pi
3
. Different colors
correspond to different choices of θ1 angle in (20): blue - θ1 =0.0025 pi, red - θ1 =0.005 pi, orange - θ1 =0.0075 pi, red - θ1 =0.01
pi. In agreement with (36), for all cases the estimated error of the procedure constitute an upper bound on the error. The error
of the procedure is orders of magnitude smaller than its estimated value.
FIG. 4: The estimated error of the procedure (using formula (36)) - left plot and, the error of the procedure (absolute value of
the difference between rotation angle and the angle calculated by the procedure ∆θ = |θ − θM′ | ) -right plot vs. the number
of points r=10n (n=1 denotes that 10 points were used) for the state ρ˜SWAP = ΛA ⊗ IBA′B′ , where Λ(ρ) = p I2 + (1 − p)ρ.
Rotation angle θ = pi
4
, p = 1
10
. Different colors correspond to different choices of θ1 angle in (20): blue - θ1 =0.0025 pi, red - θ1
=0.005 pi, orange - θ1 =0.0075 pi, red - θ1 =0.01 pi. In agreement with (36), for all cases the estimated error of the procedure
constitute an upper bound on the error. The error of the procedure is orders of magnitude smaller than its estimated value.
FIG. 5: The estimated error of the procedure (using formula (36)) - left plot and the error of the procedure (absolute value of
the difference between rotation angle and the angle calculated by the procedure ∆θ = |θ − θM′ | ) -right plot vs. the number
of points r=10n (n=1 denotes that 10 points were used) for the state ρ˜SWAP = ΛA ⊗ IBA′B′ , where Λ(ρ) = pρ+ (1− p)σzρσz.
Rotation angle θ = pi
7
, p= 3
10
. Different colors correspond to different choices of θ1 angle in (20): blue - θ1 =0.0025 pi, red - θ1
=0.005 pi, orange - θ1 =0.0075 pi, red - θ1 =0.01 pi. In agreement with (36), for all cases the estimated error of the procedure
constitute an upper bound on the error. The error of the procedure is orders of magnitude smaller than its estimated value.
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FIG. 6: The estimated error of the procedure (using formula (36)) - left plot and the error of the procedure (absolute value of
the difference between rotation angle and the angle calculated by the procedure ∆θ = |θ − θM′ | ) -right plot vs. the number of
points r=10n (n=1 denotes that 10 points were used) for the state ρpriv = pρSWAP + (1− p)ρMSWAP . Rotation angle θ = pi8 ,
p= 2
5
. Different colors correspond to different choices of θ1 angle in (20): blue - θ1 =0.0025 pi, red - θ1 =0.005 pi, orange - θ1
=0.0075 pi, red - θ1 =0.01 pi. In agreement with (36), for all cases the estimated error of the procedure constitute an upper
bound on the error. The error of the procedure is orders of magnitude smaller than its estimated value.
FIG. 7: The estimated error of the procedure (using formula (36)) and the error of the procedure (absolute value of the
difference between rotation angle and the angle calculated by the procedure ∆θ = |θ − θM′ | ) vs. the number of points r=10n
(n=1 denotes that 10 points were used) for the state ρpriv = (ΛA ⊗ 1BA′B′)ρSWAP , ΛA(ρ) = K†1ρK1 + K†2ρK2 where Ki are
given by (46). Rotation angle θ = pi
8
, u=0.1 pi, v=0.05 pi. Different colors correspond to different choices of θ1 angle in (20):
blue - θ1 =0.0025 pi, red - θ1 =0.005 pi, orange - θ1 =0.0075 pi, red - θ1 =0.01 pi. As discussed in Sec.V in this case proposed
estimation scheme is no longer valid. The error of the procedure can be grater than its estimated value.
